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ABSTRACT
We study a longitudinal sample of over one million French workers and over 500,000
employingfinns. Real total annual compensation per worker is decomposcd into components
related to observable characteristics, worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity and residual
variation. Except for the residual, all components may be correlated in an arbitrary fashion. At
the level of the individual, we find that person-effects, especially those not related to observables
like education, are the most important source of wage variation in France. Firm-effects, while
important, are not as important as person-effects. At the level of firms, we find that enterprises
that hire high-wage workers are more productive but not more profitable. They are also more
capital and high-skilled employee intensive. Enterprises that pay higher wages, controlling for
person-effects, are more productive and more profitable. They arc also more capital intensive
but arc not more high-skilled labor intensive. We also find that person-effects explain 92% of
inter-industiy wage differentials.
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CANADA1 Introduction
For several decades labor economists have lamented the lack of microeco-
nomic data relating characteristics of firms to characteristics of their workers
(see, for example, Rosen (1986) and Willis (1986)) because such data would
permit researchers to begin to disentangle the effects of firm-level human re-
source policies from the effects of external choices made by individual work-
ers. Why do high-compensation firms pay more than the apparent going
wage? Perhaps such a strategy delivers a gain in productivity or profitabil-
ity that exceeds the incremental wage cost, as predicted by efficiencywage
and agency models.' Perhaps high-paying firms select workers with higher
external wage rates, thus sorting the workers into firms that have differential
observed compensation programs.2 Although broadly representati 'e linked
surveys of firms and workers are not available in the U.S., there have now
been numerous studies that attempt to relate firm performance to the de-
sign of the compensation system.3 Furthermore, many have analyzed the
inter-industry wage differentials among individuals as they were the mani-
festation of differences in firm level compensation policies. 41n thispaper
we present the first extensive statistical analysis of the individual- and firm-
level heterogeneity in compensation determination. We examine variation in
personal wage rates holding firm-effects constant and variation in firm wage
rates holding personal effects constant. Due to the longitudinal nature of our
data, we are able to control for both measured and unmeasured heterogeneity
in the workers and their employing firms.
A high-wage worker is a person with total compensation higher than
expected on the basis of observable characteristics like labor force experi-
ence, education, region, or sex. A high-wage firm is an employer with :orn-
'See Lazear (1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Hart and Hölmstrom (1987) and Sap-
pington (1991) for concise statements of the theories generating these predictions. Tests of
these models have been performed by Abowd (1990), Abowd and Kramarz (1993), Cahuc
and Dormont (1992), Gibbons and Murphy (1990, 1992) and Hutchens (1987) Kahn and
Sherer (1990), Leonard (1990).
2This view is espoused by Bulow and Summers (1976), Cain (1976), Jovatiovic (1979),
and Roy (1951). Some tests of these models include Dickens and Lang (1985), Flinn
(1986), Gibbons and Katz (1991) and Heckman and Sedlacek (1985).
3See Ehrenberg and Milkovich (1987), Ehrenberg (1990), Ichniowski and Shaw(1993)
4See Dickens and Katz (1987), Gibbous and Katz (1992), Groshen (1991), Krueger and
Summers (1988), Thaler (1989).
9pensation higher than expected given these same observable characteristics.
Until now all empirical analyses of personal and firm heterogeneity in coin-
pensation outcomes have relied upon data that were inadequate to identify
separately the individual-effect necessary to classify a worker as high-wage
and the firm-effect required to classify a firm as high-wage. Using a unique
longitudinal data set on firms and workers that is representative of private
French employment, we are able to estimate both components of compen-
sation determination, allowing for unrestricted correlation among them. In
the estimated models, we find that individual-effects are statistically more
important than firm-effects and that the two are not strongly correlated;
however, the economic interpretation of these statements is complicated by
the mobility patterns in the data. Although our statistical model allows
for the identification of both firm- and individual-effects, we show that for
many simple economic models, the structural heterogeneity of the workers
and employers is not identical to the statistical heterogeneity measured by
our descriptive model.
We use the results of our individual-level data analysis to relate firm-
level outcomes and choices to the structure of the firm's compensation policy.
Specifically, we ask whether firms that hire high-wage workers are more prof-
itable (no), more productive per worker (yes), more capital intensive (yes),
more professional-employment intensive (yes), more skilled labor intensive
(no) and more likely to survive (yes). Second, we ask whether high-wage
firms are more profitable (yes), more productive per worker (yes), more capi-
tal intensive (yes), more professional-employment intensive (no), more skilled
labor intensive (no) and more likely to survive (maybe). Finally, we aggregate
our results to the industry level, where we find that high-wage workers and
high-wage firms are both explanations of the inter-industry wage differential
with high-wage workers being much more important empirically.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our analysis data
set. Section 3 describes our methods for identifying and estimating the large
number of statistical effects that characterize worker and firm compensation
heterogeneity and provides several potential economic interpretations of the
descriptive model's parameters. Section 4 describes our results. Section 5
concludes. A Data Appndix describes our manipulation of the French data
in great detail. Finally, a Model Appendix gives details of the theoretical
calculations
32 Data Description and Sampling Plans
Our sample of workers comes from the Declarations Annuelles de Salaires
(DAS), an annual survey of employer-reported earnings subject to French
social security taxes. We follow approximately one million individuals over
the years from 1976 to 1987. The sample is a 1/25th extract of the French
work force, excluding government employees (but including employees of
government-owned businesses). Our compensation measure is the real to-
tal annual compensation cost for the employee. This includes direct salary
and all benefit costs.5 The data source reports the number of days worked
per year. Part time workers were excluded. The total compensation measure
for part year workers was annualized on a base of 360 days per year. The
data included the individual's age, sex, location of job, occupation, and an
identifier for the employer. We supplemented these data with information
on the individual's education, available for ten percent of the sample and
imputed for the rest (see the Data Appendix). We followed workers and
employers across years and assigned a worker to the employer for whichhe
or she had the largest number of paid days in a given year. We refer to the
resulting analysis data file as the "individual data."
Our sample of firms comes from the annual survey BCnéfices Industriels
et Commerciaux (BIC), which collects a large amount of income statement,
balance sheet, employment and flow of funds information in support of the
French national accounts. We use a probability sample of 20,000 of these
firms, followed from 1978 to 1988, constructed by INSEE to facilitate research
on firms (INSEE, 1989, 1990a-1990c). Our measures of firm performance
include value added per employee, operating income as a I)roPOrtiOfl of total
assets and sales per employee. As measures of factor inputs we calculated
total real assets and total year-end employment. We added detailed measures
of the firm's employment structure (professional, skilled and unskilled) from
the annual Enquête sur la Structure des Emplois (Survey of employment
structure). We refer to the resulting analysis data file as the "firm data."
The worker and firm samples are linked using an identification number
(SIREN) for the employer that corresponds to a business unit—one or mimore
establishments engaged in a related economic activity. Thus, our analysis
5Soiiie components of employer compensation costs were estimated bytheRevenus
division at INSEE.
4of firm-effects is at the level of an enterprise and not at the level of estab-
lishments. We do not use the ownership structure of our firms. When the
enterprises change owners but remain in the same business, their SIRENs
do not normally change. Thus, we are able to follow the economic activ-
ity of our firms through most financial and ownership restructurations. We
use the linked individual-firm data to estimate the relation among various
compensation policies and firm-level economic variables.
3 A Statistical Model for Individual Com-
pensation
The basic compensation equation for an individual is given by
Yit =x/3+ O + 1I'J(i,)it + Ej (1)
where y is the compensation of individual i =1,...,N, for time t =F1,...,
F1is the first year an individual appears in the data, L1 is the last year s/he
appears in the sample, and the function J(i, t) gives the identity j of the
employing firm for individual i at date t. The effect x1/3 is the predicted
effect of time varying, person-specific characteristicswith 3 being a vector
of parameters to be estimated. The time-invariant individual-effect 0: S
decomposed as
O1=Os.+Ui7 (2)
where u, is a vector of observable time-invariant person-specific characteris-
tics arid i is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The firm-effect 'J(i,t)it
is decomposed as
?J(i,t) + 'Yi J(i,t)SJ(i,t)it •+• '12 J(i,t) Ti (sJ(1,t)1 — 10) (3)
where cJ(i,t), 'YlJ(i,t) and '12J(i,t) are firm-specific parameters to be estimated,
SJ(j,t)It is individual i's seniority at date tin firm J(i, t) and the function Ti(z)
is the linear spline basis function6
10for z < 0 1
zforz>0 (4)
6The use of a linear spline at 10 years of seniority is a specification that we found better
suited to these data than a quadratic. As will become evident below, three parameters at
the firm level is already quite flexible and we did not find much to be gained by adding
additio- polynomial tems in seniority.
5Finally, the error term e is stochastically independent of all other effects
in equation (1) with E[EJ0 and Var[egJ =o.The stochastic structure
of XtI9,0,and is unrestricted so that these effects may be cross-
correlated. The identification conditions imposed upon the model are
=0
and
Ijj2 ll)J(j) =0.
3.1 Potential Interpretations of the Descriptive Model
We illustrate the relation between structural heterogeneity in the popula-
tions of workers (heterogeneous abilities or tastes) and firms (heterogeneous
efficiencies or technologies) and the statistical heterogeneity in equation (1)
using three economic models with very simple population structures. In each
case we derive the conditional expectation of individual compensation given
the identity of the employing firm and the individual. We then relate the
parameters of this conditional expectation to our statistical pararneterization
above.
3.1.1Amatching model with endogenous turnover
Suppose that workers are homogeneous. There are two types of firms, in and
n, and two periods. In type m firms a worker's marginal product and wage
rate are always w', and employment is always available in a type infirm.In
type n firms there is a matching process. Worker i's productivity is w + e
in both periods withdrawnfrom a binomial distribution B(—H, H, ).
Thematching outcome, e,,, unknown to both the worker and the firm at the
beginning of the first period of employment, is realized at the end of the first
period and becomes public information. Workers are offered contracts at the
beginning of the first period of the form (w1, w2) and workers may leave firm
n at the end of the first period. All firms make zero profits. The equilibrium
contract for firms of type ri is (w —, w+ es,). All workers in type n firms
with a bad matching outcome (—H) quit to type in firms.
To simplify the model, we consider a stationary situation with nine work-
ers who flve for two periods each, three born in period 0, three born in period
61, three born in period 2. Two workers in each generation enter type n firms,
one worker in each generation enters a type rn firm. Of the two workers who
entered type n firms, let one draw a positive matching outcome and the other
draw a negative matching outcome. The worker with the negative match-
ing outcome leaves the type iifirmfor a type m firm when the matching
parameter is made public.
The structure of the data implied by this theoretical model is shown in
appendix Table Bi. This corresponds to the following parameter values in
our descriptive model:
= W
whereis the overall mean;
where c is person i person-effect;
(cbm,"ym) = (0,0)
for the type infirmcompensation policy; and
H 3H
(qn,fn) = (—--,——)
forthe type n firm compensation policy.
3.1.2Arent-splitting model with exogenous turnover
Suppose there are four different individuals, two types of firms, in and n,
and two time periods. Each of the two firms earns quasi-rents of q7, and
the quasi-rents are split by negotiation so that the workers receive a share
s, of the quasi-rent in firm j.Supposethat each firm employs two workers.
With probability one, exactly one worker is randomly selected to separate
from the period one employer and be re-employed at the other firm in the
second period. All information about the workers and firms is known to
those parties but not to the statistician. All workers are included in the data
sample and the typical worker has wages of the form:
YitXi+sjq
7where xj is the measure of wage rate heterogeneity, i.e. the worker type,
q follows a binomial distribution B(—Q, Q,), i= 1..., 4, jin,n, and
t=1,2.
Table B2 shows the relation among the theoretical parameters, x, s3, and
Q,andthe statistical parameters of equation (1) for each worker and each
period. The model cannot be solved exactly. Thus, we use these relations to
solve, by least squares, the moment equations that determine the relations
between the statistical parameters and the model parameters. This yields:
(1 =
whereis the overall mean;
a1 =(—3smQ —sQ
—x,) + xj
a2 = (—sQ —3sQ—x)+ x2
= (smQ+3sQ — x1)+ x3
= (3smQ + sQ —x)+ X4
where the a are the four person effects;()=((Sn 5m)Q25Q)
and()= ((SnsT)Q—2sQ)
are respectively the type m and type n firms' policies.
S3.1.3 An incentive model with unobserved individual heterogene-
ity
Following Kramarz and Rey (1994), consider workers who are heterogeneous
with respect to a parameter q E [0, 1], which is known to them but not known
to the firms. Suppose, furthermore, that there are two types of firms, m and
n, that differ according to their technology, and that there are two time
periods. At type m firms, workers are hired for one period and have a level
of productivity 11*regardlessof their q. At type n firms, workers are hired in
period one, produce y regardless of their q, and choose an effort level, either
oorE, to exert during on-the-job training. At the end of the first period,
workers in firm type n take a formal, verifiable test. If worker q exerts effort
E, the test is passed with probability q. Otherwise, the test is passed with
probablity kq, where (0 <k<1).At the beginning of the second period,
the firm decides which workers to keep and the workers may leave on their
own. Workers who exert effort E have a level of productivity in the second
period of y + Tq if they remain in a type n firm.
There are many type rn firms and two type n firms, which compete for
workers in both periods. Workers in type in firms always receive a wage
w. Workers in type ri firms are offered a wage contract (w1(q), w2(q), b(q)),
where w1(q) is the first period wage, w2(q) is the second period wage, and
b(q) is the bonus paid to those who pass the test. In equilibrium all finns of
both types make zero profits because of the competition to attract workers.
Furthermore, if y + S(y + Tq)isconvex in q (6 being the rate of discount of
future earnings), the equilibriumcontract will be such that w1(q)y—qb(q),
w2(q) =y-I- Tq, and
b(q) =
Allworkers with type q, q ￿ p, will choose to enter one of the type n firms
and will choose to exert effort E when b(p) ￿
Tosimplify the model, we suppose that rq =r-and that parameters are
such that p =Wealso suppose that there are nine workers, three of whom
are employed by type in firms and the remaining six work in type n firms.
Appendix Table B3 shows the wage of every individual in each firm afl(l
in each period in terms of the theoretical model, as well as iii terms of the
7Proofs of all these assertions can be found in Kramarz and Rey (1994).
9descriptive model. These equations can be solved in order to express each
parameter of the descriptive model using parameters of the theoretical model.
As in the rent-splitting model, the solution is not exact—we must use least
squares to express the function of the theoretical parameters that is closest to
the statistical parameter. To see why, consider the workers in type n firws.
Individual 7 passed the test and, consequently, received a bonus. This result
generates a seniority slope for individual 7. Individual 8 did not pass the test
and therefore received no bonus in period 2. Thus individual 8 has a diffeietii
seniority slope in the same firm. The statistical parameter -y,, measures the
average seniority slope in the firm n. Thus, the resulting estimated seniority
slope will be the least squares estimate of the average of the two slopes. We
illustratethese solutions for all the statistical parameters below.
The overall mean, p, is given by the following:
6r ' q16r q w 2y
The individual effects, c, i =4,5,6,7 are:
= qj( —2) +5q(2 —qi)+ q],i =4,5,6,7
j=8
and those for individual i =8,9are:
=[qj(qj—2) + q —5q]
where k =8,9,ik. Finally, the individual effects for i =1,2,3and the
firm effects for in are not separately identifiable, since there are no movements
between firms. We arbitrarily set:
=O,i=1,2,3
for these individuals, implying a firm effect of:
6r 2w*2y
3
10For type n firms we have:
£7 9 * uT 2 1' = —2)—5•j:q1 —---+ "i=4 i=8
The seniority slopes are:
=0
for firm inand
7 9
=[>Jq(3q+2)+3qfl
for firm n.
Notice that the a of the workers in the type n firm depend upon their
hidden characteristics qi as well as the characteristics of their fellow workers.
Note also that the intercept in type infirmsis larger than that of type ri
firms.Finally, as mentioned above, the seniority slope,in type n flims is
the least squares average of the career paths in the firm, depending on the
success or failure of the test.
Although we do not attempt to recover the parameters of any particular
theoretical model from the estimates produced below, we will use the sim-
ple theoretical frameworks outlined in this subsection to comment upon the
results. No single economic model is likely to explain a large, diverse labor
market like the one we study. Nevertheless) it is important to keep in mind
that it is not always possible to make a direct interpretation of the statistical
parameters (for individual or firm) in terms of simple economic parameters.
In general, the interpretation of a given statistical parameter depends upon
all the elements of the economic model under consideration.
3.2 Computation and Identification in the Statistical
Model
In the context of equation (1), our goal is to estimate the invariant parame-
ters /3 and 11consistentlyin the presence of individual- and firm-effects that
may be correlated with the person-specific characteristics. Next, we want to
estimate 0, and J(i,t)it in a manner that allows us to use these estimates,
when averaged within a firm j,aspotential explanatory variables for differ-
ences in firm productivity, profitability, factor utilization and survival. The
11computational problem we face is that the least squares design matrix implied
by equations (2) and (3) is enormous and cannot be simplified using any of
the standard techniques in linear models (as, for example, in Scheffe, 1959).
There are over one million individuals and 500,000 firms (of which 14,000
have at least 10 individual-year observations) represented in our data. Thus,
eliminating the individual-effects from (1) by deviations from person-means
leaves a high dimension, non-sparse, non-patterned least squares equation
system to solve for the time-invariant and firm-specific parameters. Siini-
larly, eliminating the firm-effects by deviations from firm-means (conditional
on seniority) leaves an equally complex least squares equation system to solve.
Finally, adopting Chamberlain's (1984) method of projecting the individual-
and firm-effects onto a set of person and firm characteristics, while permit-
ting consistent estimation of /9 and i, complicates our second goal by forcing
us to model the firm-level effects of compensation policies directly in (1).
We adopt a variant of Chamberlain's method with a simplification first
proposed by Mundlak (1978). In our projection method we project the firm-
effect onto a vector of firm and person characteristics constructed so as to
allow the desired correlation among the individual-effects, observable individ-
ual characteristics and the firm-effects. This permits consistent estimation of
/9andleast squares estimation of 0.Theresulting estimates are then used to
produce consistent estimates of the firm-effects and of the firm-level averages
of the individual-effects, which we use in our firm-level analysis.
It is worth discussing why we rejected two potential computational sun-
plifications: sampling individuals and sampling firms, thus reducing the di-
mensionality of the person- and firm-effects to make the problem tractable.
The person effects are typically identified by repeated observations on the
same individual and the firm effects are typically identified by multiple em-
ployees in the same firm. When both types of effect are present in the same
model, firm-effects are identified by the presence in the sample of individuals
observed for multiple years and in multiple firms that employ other mem-
bers of the sample. Without some movement of the individuals among the
firms, neither firm- nor person-effects are separately identifiable. However,
a relatively small amount of mobility suffices to identify many firm- arid
person-effects. The identification of the person and firm effects for individu-
als with at least two observations occurs whenever these individuals work at
least once in a firm that has at some point employed a person who changed
employers. When sampling individuals, as the size of the sample increases,
12the representativeness of the estimated firm-effects improves because in small
samples of individuals the identified firm-effects are mostly from large firms,
whereas in larger samples the additional individuals increase the probability
that there will be a mover among the smaller firms. Furthermore, reducing
the size of the individual sample would have prevented us from estimating
firm-specific seniority returns because there are fewer and fewer firms with
adequate sample sizes as the sample of individuals is reduced. On the other
hand, when sampling firms we can estimate only selected firm-effects using
all the available individual observations, assuming that the firm-effects from
the nonsampled firms are zero. To obtain a representative, reasonably large
set of firm-effect estimates, this procedure would have to be repeated many
times (approximately 1,000 times to reproduce the firm-effects we have esti-
mated by our preferred method). It is not obvious that this procedure offers
any computational advantages.
Regardless of the computational approach used, between-employer mo-
bility of the individuals is essential for the identification of our statistical
model. Table 1 examines the pattern of inter-employer movements among
all sample individuals. The rows of Table 1 correspond to the number of
years a person is in the sample. The columns, with the exception of column
(la), correspond to the number of employers the individual had. An indi-
vidual contributes to only one cell (again, excepting column (la)). Notice
that 59.4% of the individuals in the sample never change employers (column
(1)).8 Approximately one-fifth of the single employer individuals worked in
firms with no movers while four-fifths (47.9% of the overall sample, coluiiin
(la)) worked in firms that, at one time or another, employed a person who
changed employer. Thus, 88.5% of the sample individuals contribute to the
estimation of firm-effects. It is also interesting to notice the pattern of em-
ployer spells among the movers (columns (2)-(10)). The second line of each
cell shows the most frequent configuration of employer spells for individuals
in that cell. In almost every case, short spells precede longer spells, indicat-
ing that mobility is greater in the early career (as Topel and Ward (1992)
found for American men). It seems clear from Table 1 that the data should
allow us to separate the individual-effect from the firm-effect.
8Notice that the cell (1,1) contains 318,627 individuals who appear in the sample during
a single year. Some of these individuals may represent coding etrors in the person identifier;
however, it is not possible to correct these errors.
133.3 A Projection Method for Estimating Correlated
Effects
Our proposed method allows us to estimate the parameters 3consistentlyin
the presence of both individual- and firm-effects without adopting a step-wise
approach that imposes orthogonality among the different effects. We project
the firm-effect onto the firm and individual data according to the equation:
j(,t) + 7i J(it)SJ(it)ti •+•7 .J(i,)Ti (sj(1,t)It —10)=
[fJ(,)t® [i Sj(1,t)It Ti (sJ(1,t —10)]®Xi] \ + 11J(i,t)it (5)
where fJ(i, is a vector of time varying firm characteristics (firm size iii our
application),is the vector of person-averages of x:
1 L
(6) 't=F,
L, —F1+ 1 \ is the parameter vector of the linear projection and VJ(,t)tt
is the stochastic error of the linear projection. Let
® [1 SJ(jt)1 Ti (sJ(1,t) —10)]® (7)
then
=xjj3 +z+01 + E + UJ(it)it. ()
Restated as deviations from individual-averages, equation (8) becomes
Yit =x1il3+ Zie)t + 61t + l1J(i,t)it (i)
where
itxii— (1(i)
and similarly for and J(ii)it. Least squares estimation of fi and
yields:
asN(II)
A A z'xz'z)
14where
X1T1 Z1T1
X ... ... ando Var + 1J(i,)it X, Z}
XN1 ZN1
Estimatesof the individual effects 0 are recovered in the conventional manner
as
(12)
and the limit distribution of 0 is
}Var[ ][] +)asN_-cx
(13)
We note that although the least squares estimate of the individual effect 0 is
not consistent as N —*co,this is not a problem when we estimate firm-level
models because the firm-average of 0, can be consistently estimated.
Next consider the estimation of the firm effects J(i,t)+Yi J(i,)SJ(1,t +
72J(i,)Ti (sj(,t)
-10).Define
{j}{(i,t) IJ(i,t) =j} ,aset with N, elements, (14)
Y{2}Y{j) — — 0{}, (15)
Y{j} y ,V(n,s) E {j}, (16)
and similarly for X{}andO. Equations (14) and (15) group all ol the
observations on individuals employed by the same firm into the vector
which is expressed as a deviation from the x effects and the individual
effects. The firm-level equation is:
=F{2}7i+c{,} (17)
72j
15where
[1 s5 Ti(s3 —
10)]
,V(n,s){j} (18)
and
c{}e{} +X{j} (/3 —+(O{} (19)
Least squares estimation of (17) yields the estimator
/c6
5 —N,,JasN—*cx (20)
2j \. 2jI
where
(F;F)' + (F;}F{})' F}
(X{,} Var [$]+ Var [o]+2X{,} Coy [/3,O{.)J) F(,J (F)F{)J)' (21)
and o =Var[c].
Torecover the a1 and uir/ parts of the individual effect, estimate the
equation (2) by generalized least squares to obtain ,whichsatisfies:
N (,(u'Diag(var[i])'u)') as N oo (22)
where
U1
(23)
UN
and Diag (Var [J)is a diagonal matrix containing the variances of O from
equation (13). The estimator of a is
(24)
and
—+N
[i
— (u'Diag (Var [o1])'u)'])
, asN -oc
(5)
16Next we estimate the firm-level average a, defined as
> (26)
.7V(i,)E{j)
with asymptotic distribution:
(27)
where
[1(u'Diag(var[iJ)' U)ui].
Similarly, the firm-level average education effect is given by
(28)
IV(i,t)E{j)
withasymptotic distribution based upon (22).
3.4 Analysis of Firm-level Outcomes
We consider next the statistical relation between firm-level outcomes arid our
measures of firm-level compensation policy. Our basic model is
=j qj ][] +j (29)
where j= 1,.. .J,the total number of firms in the firm sample, p is any
firm-level outcome, [ci11,ij y, 72j} isa vector of firm-level com-
pensation measures, r is a vector of parameters of interest, q is a vector
of other firm-level variables, p is a vector of associated parameters and
is a zero-mean homoscedastic statistical error. In the regression analysis,
firm-level outcomes and firm-level compensation variables were measured us-
ing data from two independently drawn samples. However, the firm-level
91n all our asymptotic results we hold constant the distribution of firm sizes. Thus as
N, N5 —poo,weassume that their ratio goes to a non-zero constant.
17compensation variables derived from our individual sample are estimatedre-
gressors. Consequently, we must allow for the estimation errors in &,,.,, 5 and2j in our assessment of the precision of the estimation of firm-level
equations.'° Equation (29) becomes
=[cxiujj 71i'Y2jq1J
J
+
([o,iiji qj 71j 72j ]LXj Ujl/ j'Yi372j7! +
(30)
where([a11i7c5.,'n., 72]— { &I2J %'Y2jir is the error
associated with the first-step estimation of the firm-level compensation measures.'1
In order to derive the error covariance matrix for equation(30), let
P'()[ &ri3fj7qj }
and
=[&i7 72
Now, euation (30) can be re-expressed in a first order approximation around
as:
(31)
where
—-
= (5—) i , + , '-'2L"
'°Thefirm-level regressor ,4ëalsocontains some measurement error, in principle; how-
ever, the vector /3 is estimated with such precision that we do not carry along its estimated
covariance matrix (including its estimated covariance with &,iji, 4j, ,•,andj2) in these
calculations. Hence, we placein the list of qj.
"We adopt the model of Pagan (1984) and Murphy and Topel(1985); namely, that the
regression of interest relates a function of the individual-level data and several firm-level
parameters to the other measured firm-level outcomes. We account for the estiniation
error ([ -y Y2j] — [ &ii7 72explicitly, but we do
not add an additional measurement error. Thus, for example, we assert that the ontt-ome
Pj depends upon c and not upon aj +wherej is an independent measurement error.
18The variance of the regression error term for equation (31) consists of the
component due to the estimation error in P1plusthe component due to
Var[wj}[7r' PuJvar[}L{J+Var[ei] (32)
where the components of Var [jjaredefined in the derivations above. We
estimate equation (31) using generalized least squares basedupon the error
variance in equation (32).
4 Estimation Results
Table 2 shows the basic summary statistics, bysex, for the individual-level
data. The usable sample consists of 3,434,530 observations on 711,518men
and 1,870,578 usable observations on 454,787 women. The basic individual-
level variables consist of labor force experience, region of France, education
level and seniority. Note that about 30% of the sample has no known educa-
tional attainment. For 74% of the individuals, there are enough observations
in the sample to permit estimation of a distinct firm-effect.'2 Recall from
Table .thatsome 27% of our individuals appear in only one of the 10 data
years while 10.6% are present for all 10 years. More than 59% of the indi-
viduals have only a single employer while 2, 3 and 4 employers account for
21.8%, 10.7%, and 4.8% of the individuals, respectively.
The results of our projection method for estimating the basicregression
parameters are shown in Table 3, separately for men and women. These
estimates are the results of applying the multiplestep procedure presented
in section 3. The results shown in the columns "ProjectionMethod," thus,
come from two separate regression models—the one shown in equation (2),
for the education coefficients, and theone shown in equation (9), for the
time-varying individual characteristics.13 For comparisonpurposes, Table 3
also shows the ordinary leastsquares results, the within estimates for fixed
'2The individuals from firms with fewer than 10 observations in thesample were pooled
and a single firm-level regression was used to estimate their firm-effects.
'3The remaining coefficients from equation(9) can be found in the Data Appendix. 'l'he
seniority coefficients shown for the projection method are the individualaverages of
and 2jfromTable 4.
19person-effects and the within estimates for fixed firm-effects. Evidently, the
projection method results are much closer to the within-person estimates
than to those within firms whereas the leastsquares results are closer to the
within-firm estimates.
Table 4 contains descriptive statistics for thecomponents of real com-
pensation implied by the estimated parameters from equation (1)separately
for each sex. For both males and females, the standard deviationof the
individual-effect, and its components aand u, is much larger than that of
the firm-effect, and its components ,yj and)'2. As noted in Table 3, the
complete parameterization in explains 80% of the variation in real salaries
for men and 75% for women; thus, the idiosyncraticcomponent of variance
is still rather important.
Table 5 shows the intercorrelations of the components ofcompensation.
All components of compensation except the residual account for 81% of the
variance of real total annual compensation costs (combined result for males
and females). Furthermore, the a component of the individual-effect(the
part not explained by education) is more important than the observable re-
gressors (xj3) in explaining compensation costs. The overall firm effect, ,
onthe other hand, is only about one-quarter as importantas the overall
person-effect. The individual-effect and the firm-effect are correlated 0.10
according to our results. The a and q components are correlated 0.08 ac-
cording to this method. Notice that although the firm-specific intercept, ',
andthe a-component of the individual effect are positively correlated, the
firm-specific intercept is negatively correlated with the seniority slope (-0.56).
One may get the impression from Table5 that the individual-effects and
firm-effects are not highly correlated. Table 6 shows that this is notcom-
pletely correct. In this table we begin to address the problem of inter-
employer mobility in our sample. If the mobility in the economy isexogenous;
that is, if the probability of separation from one firm and accession intoan-
other does not depend upon the individual'swage path, then the association
of the parameter ctjwiththe pay practices of firm jiscorrect. Otherwise, the
movers and stayers systematically sort according to their values of a, ,and
e. In this second case, measured values of firm-effects are contaminated by
the average values of individual-effects of the movers relative to thestayers,
as can be seen in the two endogenous mobility models discussed above.
For Table 6, the individuals were divided into threegroups according to
their a's. High-a workers are much more likely to be observed in a single
20job (one employer) whereas low-cr workers are relatively more likely tohave
had three or more employers. High-cr workers also have more labor-force
experience. Although a andare positively correlated, low- workers are
more likely to have had multiple employers. In particularthe low-a low-gb low
experience workers are the most likely to have had multiple employers. Table
7 examines the mobility of high-cr versus low-cr workers explicitly. Persons
with low estimated individual-effects are much more likely to move between
low-ç5 jobs than are persons with high individual-effects (57% versus 40%).
Evidently the clean distinction between individual heterogeneity and firm
heterogeneity is called into question by this pattern. Do we estimate low cr's
because the individual has moved through a sequence of low-4' jobs or rather
because some employers are more likely to choose low-a workers, who are
more mobile for a variety of reasons? Our analysis does not provide a clear
answer to this question.
Table 8 presents summary statistics for the sample of firms (weighted
to be representative of private industrial firms). Table 9 presents regression
models for the logarithm of real value added per employee, real sales per
employee (measures of productivity) and operating income as a proportion
of total assets (a measure of performance). Using the firm-level compensa-
tion policy measures generated by our projection method, we note that a
larger value of the predicted wage (xfl-component) is associated with higher
value-added and sales per worker and higher profitablity. A larger individual-
effect (a-component) is associated with a substantially larger value-added
per employee and sales per employee but not with higher profitability.The
part of the individual-effect related to education (wi-component) is associ-
ated with higher value-added per worker but is not significant in the other
two columns. Higher firm-specific wages (-component) are associated with
higher productivity (value-added per worker and sales per worker) and with
higher profitability. Neither seniority slope is associated with higher (or
lower) productivity or profitability.
Table 10 presents the results for the relations among our compensation
measures and a variety of firm-level factor utilization rates. Larger values of
the x/3-component of compensation are associated with higher employment,
capital, capital-labor ratio, professional employment proportion and skilled
employment proportion. The cr-component of the individual-effect is posi-
tivelv associated with total employment, total real capital, the capital-labor
ratio and the proportion of engineers, technical workers and managers in the
21work force, and is negatively related to the shares of both skilled and uii-
skilledworkers. Larger values of the average education effect are associated
with higher total employment, total real capital and professional propor-
tion but lower values of the skilled proportion. The firm-specific intercept
(ç-component of the firm effect) is strongly positively associated with total
employment, total real capital and capital intensity but is not associated with
any components of the skill structure of thework force. Employment propor-
tions are not related to this component of the firm effect in compensation. A
high firm-specific seniority slope is positively associated with capital intensity
and slightly associated with the proportion of professional employees.
Table 11 presents a proportional hazards analysis of the relation between
the survival of firms and our estimated compensation components at the firm
level. Both components of the individual effect (a and the education part
uii) increase survivorship in a statistically significant manner. The effects
relatd to firm-specific compensation factors are large but very imprecise.
The effect associated with the x/3-component goes in the opposite direction.
Finally, Table 12 uses industry-level averages of the individual and firm
specific components of compensation to explain the industry-effect found
in our raw individual data (regression adjusted for labor force experience,
region. year, education and sex) in the spirit of Dickens and Katz (1987)
and Krueger and Summers (1988). Since the right-hand side variables in
this regression fully account for the industry effects in a statistical sense
(R2 =0.97),the interesting question is the relative importance of indi\'id-
ual heterogeneity (a-component of the person effect) and firm heterogeneity
(both and -y-components) as components of the industry effects. The third
through sixth columns of Table 12 present separate industry-level regressions
using first a alone (column 3 and 4) and then the three parts of the firm-
effect by themselves (columns 5 and 6). It is clear from the fact that a alone
explains 92% of the inter-industry wage variation, whereas the firm-specific
components explain only 25%, that individual effects, asmeasured statisti-
cally are more important than firm-components. One should recall, however,
that in our example theoretical models structural firm and individual het-
erogeneity can influence both of the statistical measures.
225 Conclusions
In all likelihood, our analysis of the separate effects ofindividual arid firm
heterogeneity on wage rates and on firm compensation policieshas raised
more new questions than it hasresolved. We find that individual-effects
are a significant component of realtotal annual compensation variation.
Firm-effects, while also important, are not as important asindividual-effects.
Firm-level heterogeneity and individual-level heterogeneity are not highly
correlated; however, mobility patterns suggest that thedistinction between
an individual-effect and a firm-effect is not economicallysimple. Firms that
hire high-wage workers appear to be more productive per workerbut not
more profitable. High-wage firms—those paying higher wagescontrolling for
the individual heterogeneity of the employees—are more productive per worker
and are more profitable. Both sources of wage rate heterogeneity—high-wage
workers and high-wage firms—are associated with more capital intensive firms.
We also estimated firm-level heterogeneity in the returns to seniority. This
component of wage variation is decidedly less important in our samplethan
the tw pure heterogeneity components. We believe that our results provide
the statistical basis upon which to begin the process of testing the relevance of
agency, efficiency wage, search/matching,and endogeneous mobility models
as potential explanations for compensation outcome heterogeneity.
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 Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Basic Individual Level Variables by Sexfor 1976 to 1987
Men Women
Variable Definition Mean StdDcv MeanStd Dev
Log (Real Annual Compensation Cost, 1980 FF) 4,3442 0.5187 4.0984 0.4801
TotalLaborForceE.xperieflCe 17.2531 11.825815.4301 12.0089
(Total Labor Force Experience)2/ 100 4.3752 4.9 197 3.8230 4.9440
(Total Labor Force Experience)3/1000 13.1530 19.430511.607919.6863
(Total Labor Force Experience)4/10000 43.3453 77.954239.058980.3251
Seniority 7.7067 7.5510 6.5437 6.5268
Lives in lie-de-France (Paris Metropolitan Region) 0.2561 0.2910
No Known Degree 0.3064 0.2 190 0.2971 0.2 124
Completed Elementary School 0.1556 0. 1458 0.1893 0. 1739
Completed Junior High School 0.0565 0.0792 0.0869 0.1008
Completed High School (Baccalauréat) 0.0528 0.0804 0.0711 0.0881
Basic Vocational-Technical Degree 0.2652 0.1849 0.1926 0.1545
Advanced Vocational-Technical Degree 0.070 1 0.0893 0.0532 0.0802
Technical College or University Diploma 0.0469 0.0754 0.0838 0. 1247
Graduate School Diploma 0.0465 0.0964 0.0259 0.055 1
Year of data 81.3106 3.725081.4730 3.7180
Number of Observations for the Firm in Sample 4402.3800 16164.6200 1605.3 100 7797.1300
Observations 3,434,530 1,870,578
Pecsons 711,518 454,787
Sufficient Data Available to Estimate Firm Effect 0.7425 0.7448
Notes: For sources and methods see the Data Appendix.
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 Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Components of Log Real Total Compensation
by Seifor 1976 to 1987
Men Women
Variable Definition Mean Std Dcv MeanStd Dcv
Log (Real annual compensation costs, 1980 FF) 4.3442 0.5 187 4.0984 0.4801
xt3 -Predictedvalue 0.4261 0.1383 0.3234 0.1120
0 -Totalindividual effect 3.9160 0.4387 3.7776 0.3843
Sampling variance of 0 0.27 14 0.2758 0.3444 0.3299
c -Individual effect not related to education 0.0000 0.3947 0.0000 0.3639
Sampling variance of 0. 1357 0.1379 0.1722 0.1649
un -Individual effect related to education 3.9160 0.1915 3.7776 0.1238
Sainp1ingvarianceofu 0.1357 0.1379 0.1722 0.1649
-Totalfirm effect 0.0028 0.0685 -0.0039 0.0566
Sampling variance of qi 0.0019 0.0075 0.0020 0.0075
-Firm-specificintercept 0.0031 0.1044-0.0072 0.0969
Samplingvarianceof 0.0137 1.8867 0.0065 0.1775
-Firm-specific seniority slope -3.37e-05 0.03358.28e-04 0.032b
Sampling variance ofy1 0.0009 0.0490 0.0009 0.0576
fl-Firm-specific slope change at 10 years -5.36e-04 0.0542-1.64e-03 0.0574
Sampling variance ofy2 0.0131 1.5672 0.0122 1.3563
r-Residual -0.0006 0.2328 0.0012 0.2417
Notes: For sources and methods scc the Data Appendix.
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 Variable Defirutiort
1 Einpi'or
Log (Real Annual Cornpensauon Cost, 1980 FF)
Male
Total Labor Force Experience
-PreoicicdValue
u -Individual Effect Rclated to Education
-TotalFirm Effect
-Firm-specificIntercept
Number of Obscrvauous
Percent olObservauons in iCatcgor
Low cx Middle High
Mean Std DevMean Std DcvMean Std Dc
0476 4.221 0.302 4.6730438
0.606 0.643
1186117.12212.34123.82612.236
0.142 0.378 0.137 0.372 0127
0.202 3.845 0.165 3.879 0.183
0.073 0.009 0.066 0.008 0.058
0.110 0.011 0.109 0.014 0 114
0.213-0.000 0.159 MOOS 0 179
Tablc 6
l)escripic StatislicaforIndividual LevelVariablesby u.-Catcgory 4nd Number of Euipluci'
for 1976to 1987
c -Rcsial
3.859
0.640
IS .496
0.385
3.872
0.000
-0.004
0.007
710,892
29,57 %
3 903
0.657
12.678
0.392
3.876
-0,009
-0.014
O 005
460.275
32 56 %
3.949
0.759
11.48$
0.4 14
3.896
-0.013
-0.017
0.00 7
595,220
40.01 %
2 Enip'owrs
LogRcal Annual Conlpcns;oJwi Cost, 198() [-F)
Male
Total Labor Force Experience
x13 -PredictedValue
u -individual Effect Related to Education
-TotalFirm Effect
p -Firni-specifieIntercept
c -Residual
Number of Observattoirs
Percent ofObscrvation.sin r Caiccor
3 or.tIore Einp/uter
Log (Real Annual Comp'..isrution Cost. 1980 FE)
Male
Total Labor Force Experience
x3 -PredictedValue
u -Individual Effect RelatcO to Enucatiout
w- TwIFirm Effect
-Finn-specificIntercept
-Residual
Number of Observations
Percent of Observations iou Caicgor
773.743
32.19%
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10.24214.244
0.143 0.386
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0.467 4 235
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0.364 4.644 0 478
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9.745 17.518 10.920
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0.158 3.877 0.183
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0.088 -0.001 0,097
0.255-0.0070 27
388,430
26.11 O/
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 Table 8
Summary Statistics for Finns
Annual Averages over the Life of the Firm
______ (weightedby inverse sampling probability, 1978-1988)
Variable Definition Mean Std Dcv
Average xf3 of employees at the firm 0.3906 0.2420
Average a of employees at the firm -0.0549 0.6446
Average ui of employees at the firm 3.8503 0.2836
4- Firm-specificwage premium -0.0196 0.2707
11 -Firm-specificseniority slope 0.0027 0.0775
72 -Changein seniority slope at 10 years -0.0031 0.1728
Number of employees sampled at firm 34.2950 610.4800
Employment at December 31st (thousands) 0.1097 1.6789
Real total assets (millions FE 1980) 59.4769 3,938.9800
Operating Income/Total Assets 0.1254 0.4544
Value-added/Total Assets 1.005 1 1.8889
Real total compensation (millions FF 1980) 1.3260 2.3570
Real value added/Employee (thou. FE 1980) 106.7672 936.5212
Real total assets/Employee (thou. FF 1980) 363.07072 1,067.5500
(Engineers, Professionals and Managers)fEmployee 0.2362 0.4072
Skilled workers/Employee 0.5414 0.5255
Log(Real total assets) 1.7711 3.3558
Log(Real value added/Employee) 4.5215 1.1050
Log(Real sales/Employee) 5.5673 2.0139
Log(Total employment at December 31) -3.0262 2.1109
LogReal capitallEmployee) 4.7972 2.27 10
Age of firm (N7,385) 19.5023 23.0331
Number of firms 14,717
Notes: For sources and definitions, see the Data Appendix.
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 Table 11
Proportional Hazards Estimates of the Relation betweenFirm Survival
and Compensation Policies
Parameter Standard Risk
Independent Variable Estimate Error Ratio
Average predicted effect (xf3) 2.0751 (0.6241) 7.9650
Average c in finn -0.5327 (0.2064) 0.587()
Averageu1infirm
-1.8615 (0.5398) 0.1551)
Firm-specific
-0.5909 (0.5356) 0.5540
Firm-specific y
1.6497 (2.4598) 5.2050
Firm-specific 0.3592 (0.6677) 1.4320
(Eng., Tech., Managcrs)/EmpIoyCC 0.4096 (0.3699) 1.5060
(Skilled Workers)fEmployee 0.3372 (0.2926) 1.40 10
Notes: Negative coefficients indicate a reduced probability of firmdeath. This model
was estimated using the 7,382 firms with known birthdates. The niodel includes two-
digit industry effects.
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 A Data Appendix
A.1 Description of the DAS
The Declarations Annuelies des Salaires are a largecollection of matched
employer-employee information generated byINSEE (Institut National de
la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques).The data cover all individ-
uals employed in French enterprises who wereborn in October of even-
numbered years, with civil servants excluded.14Our extract runs from 1976
through 1987, with 1981 and 1983excluded because the underlying admin-
istrative data were not sampled in those years.The initial data set con-
tained 7,416,422 observations. Each observationcorresponds to a unique
establishment-individual-Year combination. The observationincludes an iden-
tifier that corresponds to the employee (called ID below), anidentifier that
corresponds to the establishment (SIRET)and an identifier that corresponds
to the parent enterprise of the establishment (SIREN).We have information
on the number of days the individualworked in the establishment, as well
as the full-time/part-time status ofthe employee. This allows us to aggre-
gate all of the establishments inwhich an individual worked in a given year
and thus not treat changes of establishmemit within the same enterpriseas
if they were changes of employer. Each observationalso includes, in addi-
tion to the variables listed above, the sex, month, yearand place of birth,
occupation, total net nominal earnings duringthe year and annualized gross
nominal earnings during the year for the individual, aswell as the locatioii
and industry of the employing establishment.
A.2 Observation selection, variable creationand miss-
ing data imputation
A.2.1 Aggregation of establishments
The creation of the analysis data set involved the selectionof desired mdi-
viduals, the aggregation of establishment-level data tothe enterprise level,
and tile construction of.the variables of interest from thevariables already
'4Mcron (1988) shows that individuals employed in the civil service move almost ex-
dusivelv to other positions within thecivilservke Th,, thep'cc 1'in r,f cjvl rnt
shouldnot affect our estimation of a worker's market wage equation.
37in thedataset. We selected only full-time employees (sample reduced to
5,966,620 observations). We then created a single observation for each ID-
year-SIREN combination by aggregating within ID and year over SIRETs in
the same SIREN. For each ID-year-SIREN, we summed total net nominal
earnings and total days worked over all SIRETs. We used the occupation,
location and industry that corresponded to the establishrrient in which the
individual worked the largest number of days during the year. This reduced
the number of observations to 5,965,256. We then selected the enterprise
at which the individual had worked the largest number of days during that.
year (sample reduced to 5,497,287 observations).The aggregation of total
number of days worked across all establishments occasionally yielded obser-
vations for which the total number of days worked was greater than 360
(the maximum permitted). In these cases, we just truncated days worked at
360. We then calculated an annualized net nominal earnings for the ID-year
SIREN combination. We eliminated all years of data for individuals who
were younger than 15 years old or older than 65 years old at the date of their
first appearance in the data set (sample reduced to 5,325,413 observations).
A.2.2 Total compensation costs
The dependent variable in our wage rate analysis is the annualized real total
compensation cost of the employee (LFRAISRE). To convert the annual-
ized net nominal earnings to total compensation costs, we used the tax rules
and computer programs provided by the Division Revenus at INSEE (.J.L.
Lhéritier, private communication) to compute both the employee and em-
ployer share of all mandatory payroll taxes (cotisations et charges salariales
employé et employeur) Total annualized compensation cost is defined as the
sum of annualized net nominal earnings, employee payroll taxes and eiiiployer
payroll taxes. Nominal values were then deflated by a consumer price index
to get real annualized net earnings, and real annualized total compensation
cost. We eliminated 61 observations with zero values for annualized total
compensation cost (remaining sample 5,325,352).
A.2.3 Education and Total Labor Market Experience
Our initial DAS file did not contain education information. We i.ised sun-
pleineritary information available for 10% of the DAS, (EDP, Echiiihloim
38Démographique Permanent) to impute the level of educationof all iiidivid-
uals in the DAS.15 The EDP includes information on the highest degree
obtained. There were 38 possible responses, including "no known degree."
These responses were grouped into 8 degree-level categories as shown iii ta-
ble 1. Using these eight categories and data available in the DAS, we ran
separate ordered logits for men and women to estimatecoefficients used to
impute education for the individuals in the DAS who are not partof the
EDP. EDP sample statistics for the men are in table 2, and those for the
women are in table 3. The estimated logit equations are intable 4 for men
and table 5 for women.
15Access to the EDP is particularly difficult to obtain due to privacy regulations.
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5
Sans Aucun Diplôme
CEP
DFEO
BE1C
BE
BEPS
BAC (not F, G or
Brevet superieur
CFES
CAP
BEP
E FAA
B A A
B PA
FPA icr
HP
B EA
BEC
BE II
BEI
B ES
BATA
BACF
BACG
BAC H
San té
BTS
DUT
DEST
DEUL
DEUS
DEUG
2ème cycle
3ème cycle
Grande école
CAPES
CA P E'F
No Terminal Degree
Elementary School
Junior high School
High School
Technical College and
Undergraduate University
Graduate School and Other
Post-Secondary Education
Table 1: Degree Categories
CategoryDegree U.S. Equivalent
H)
Vocational-Technical School (Basic)
Vocational-Technical School (Ad vanced) 6
S
40Table 2: EDP Sample Statistics -Men(Std. Deviations in Parentheses)
V.rtbIe
Nieme
Derree_C.1e1-ory
8 0 7 8 OverII 1 3 3
0.055 0.098 0063 0.186 008, <1924 0.188
(0391)
0.254
(0435)
0.295
(0.456)
0.160
(0.361)(0.343)
0.049
(0.228)
0.034
(0.297)
0.048
(0.243)
0026
(0389)
0.065 1925 < 0013, < 1929 — — 0.056
(0.230)
0 062
(0.242)
0.085
(0.279) (0.200) (0.215)
0068
(0.180)
0.081
(0.214)
0095
(0 1iB
0004
(u.247)
0 101 1930 < 0013,<1334 — — 0,097
(0,296)
0 109
(0.311)
0.120
(0.325)(0.250)(0 252)
0.048
(0.273)
0.063
(0.203)
0.079
(0.226)
0 047
(0.301)
0 078
1935 < 0013,< 1.133 — — 0.061
(0:240)
0.056
(0.229)
0.070
(0.255)
0.048
(0.214)(0.215)(0.244)
0.117
(0.270)
0.133
(0212)
0 118
(0.268)
0,149 1940 < 0013,< 1044 — — 0.094
(0 292)
0.070
(0.256)
0.091
(0.287)
0.075
(0.264)(0.298)(0.322)
0.130
(0.340)
0.152
(0 323)
0.175
(0 356)
0164 1945 < 0013, < 1949 0.102
(0.302)
0.064
(0.244)
0.097
(0.296)
0.099
(0.299) (0.336)
0.245
(0.336)
0.224
(0.359)
0.217
(0380)
0.288
(0370)
0.201 1950 < 0013, < 1954 0.159
(0365)
0.095
(0.293)
0.132
(0.339)
0.166
(0.372) (0.430)
0.151
(0.417)
0.145
(0.412)
0.110
(0.453)
0.176
(0 401)
0.054
1955 < DOB, 1959 0.101
(0.302)
0.072
(0.259)
0.060
(0.238) (0.386)
0.160
(0.364)
0 069
(0.352)
0.151
(0.313)
0.068
(0.381)
0 052
(6 226)
0 003 1960 < 0013, < 1976 0 141
(0 348)
0.218
(0.413) (0.218) (0.367) (0 253) (0.358)
0.187
(0.251)
0.284
(0.224)
0309
(0 056)
0.457 ,n 1k dcFronc 0.232
(0.422)
0.204
(0 403)
0.226
(0.418)
0.288
(0.453) (0.478)
0.157
(0.390)
0.199
(0.451)
0.145
(0.462)
0.184
(0 498)
0.105 C$P62 0.263
(0.440)
0.357
(0.479)
0.282
(0.450) (0.391) (0.364)
0.071
(0.399)
0.299
(0.352)
0.186
(0.387)
0.096
(0.307)
0.058 CSP6I 0.225
(0.418)
0.231
(0.422)
0.255
(0.436) (0.321) (0.266)
0.219
(0.458)
0.108
(0.390)
0.203
(0.295)
0.235
(0 233)
0.203 CSP.0 0.151
(0.358)
0 118
(0322)
0.166
(0372) (0.448)(0448)
0.233
(0.310)
0.080
(0.402)
0.258
(0424)
0.275
(0.402)
0.225 CSP4O 0.112
(0.315)
0.061
(0 240)
0.110
(0.314) (0.379) (0 423)
0 147
(0.272)
0015
(0.438)
0.057
(0.447)
0.080
(0.418)
0.359 CSP3O 0,043
(0.203)
0 020
(0.142)
0025
(0.157)
0.053
(0.224) (0.354) (0.121) (0.232) (0.271) (0.480)
2531 Nombr of 0brvooo 71229 26236 12825 3847 3036 16489 --3878
.11I'ablc 3:E1)i>SampleStatistics -Women(Std. Deviations in Parcntlieses)
V.ri.ble
Nnrr
Degree_Csteyory
Ovorsll 1 2 3 4 1 0 7
0013 < 1324 0152 0.235 0.206 0.129 0.055 0.034 0042 0.055 0.056
(0.359)(0.424)(0 405)(0.336)(0.229)(0.181)(0.202)(0.226)(0.230)
1025 <D073 1529 0.047 0.053 0.078 0 045 0.025 0.024 0.017 0022 0023
(0,212)(0 224)(0.268)(0.206)(0.156)(0.153)(0.130)(0 146)(0.148)
1530 < DOES 01934 0.084 0.096 0 118 0.070 0.043 0.051 0054 0.049 0.052 —
(0 278)(0 294)(0.322)(0.255)(0.203)(0.239)(0.226)(0.216)(0.222)
1935 < 0011 0 1933 0 054 0 056 0,069 0.047 0036 0.050 0045 0.038 0.047 — —
(0 226)(0.229)(0 254)(0.211)(0.185)(0.218)(0.208)(0.190)(0212)
1940 0 20 (3 < 1944 — — 0,083
(0.290)
0.070
(0.255)
0 113
(0 317)
0.086
(0.281)
0090
(0.287)
0 103
(0.304)
0.108
(0.311)
0.101
(0 301)
0.127
(0.334>
945 0 DOI1 0 949 — —
1950 0 iiLb K j934 —
0.114
(0.317)
0.186
(0.389)
0077
(0.267)
0 112
(0 315)
0 125
(0 331)
0 180
(0.384)
0 109
(0.311)
0.167
(0.373)
0,116
(0.321)
0.285
(0.451)
0,135
(0.341)
0 247
(0.431)
0.164
(0.371)
0.252
(0.434)
5) 156
3.3s3)
0.298
(0 457)
0,209
(5.107)
0.354
(0.478)
555 < DOS 0 2339 — — 0.120
(0325)
0.078
(0 267)
0.067
(0.251)
0.178
(0.353)
0.217
(0 412)
0.166
(0.373)
0.169
(0.375)
0 223
(0 416)
0.125
(0.331)
1960< LJr), 01976 — — 0.150
(0.357)
0.224
(0 417)
0.043
(0 202)
0.170
(0.375)
0133
(0.339)
0.180
(0.384)
0.117
(0.355)
0.059
(0.236)
0.008
(0066)
Work. rr hr Or Eronco 0.254
(0.435)
0.237
(0425)
0.239
(0.426)
0.266
(0452)
0333
(0471)
0.221
(0415)
0.316
(0.465)
0.283
(0451)
0,466
(0499)
C51'62 0227
(0.4 19)
0343
(0.475)
0.296
(0.456)
0 108
(0 310)
0.079
(0.270)
0 125
(0.331)
0.073
(0.255)
0,011
(0 240)
0053
(0 224)
COIl 0050
(0.218)
0.061
(0.239)
0.067
(0 249)
0027
(0 163)
0.023
(0.150)
0.044
(0.205)
0.027
(0 161)
0029
(0168)
0.013
(0 120) 2i 0 458
(0458)
7) 365
(0.482)
0.427
(0.495)
0 596
(0491)
0.570
(0 495)
0 539
(0498)
0 630
(0483)
0,420
(0494>
0.511
(0.500)
(:014 0073
(0361)
0.040
(0195)
0.035
(0185)
0030
(0286)
0 165
(0371)
0.045
(0208)
0.097
(0296)
0.330
(0477)
0214
0410)
(:S)'o 0,013
(0115)
0.008
(0090)
0,005
(0.068)
0.016
(0.125)
0048
(0214)
0005
(0.071)
0.009
(0093)
00)2
017b(
0 150
10357
NornL 1'i1.,)nr 57677 19622 12718 4760 3112 10385 2633 3173-1021
42'I'ab!e 4: l)egree Category Model Coefficients-Men _________
5ree Variable Coefficient
Intercept 6.254 0.122
1925 < Date of Birth <1929 -0.496 0.105
1930< Date of Birth <1934 -0.493 0.090
1935 <Dateof Birth <1939 -1.234 0.100
1940<Dateof Birth <1944 -2.031 0.085
1945 < Date of Birth <1949 -2.818 0.085
1950 < Date of Birth <1954 -3.388 0.086
1955 < Date of Birth <1959 -2.289 0.113
1960 <Dateof Birth <1976 1.897 0.360
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -0.850 0.116
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J(i,t) -0.904 0.132
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -2.758 0.111
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -4.028 0.117
Manager at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -5.892 0.124
Works in lie de France -0.627 0.048
2 Intercept 5.828 0.125
1925 <Dateof Birth <1929 -0.320 0.IUb
1930 < Date of Birth < 1934 -0.518 0.091
1935< Date of Birth <1939 -1.117 0.102
1940 <Dateof Birth <1944 -1.863 0.u7
1945<Dateof Birth <1949 -2.430 0.087
1950 <Dateof Birth <1954 -3.248 0.089
1955 <Dateof Birth <1959 -2.649 U.1 19
1960 <Dateof Birth <1976 0.246 0.363
U nskiiied Blue-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J (i, 1) -1.311 0.119
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(z, 1) -1.074 0.135
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J(z, t) -2.635 0.114
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -3.740 0.121
Manager at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -5.996 0.132
Works in lie de France _____-0.629 0.050
43Degree Variable CoefficientStd. Err.
3
.
Intercept
1925 < Date of Birth<1929
1930 <Date of Birth < 1934
1935 < Date of Birth < 1939
1940 < Date of Birth < 1944
1945 <Date of Birth < 1949
1950 <Date of Birth < 1954
1955< Date of Birth < 1959
1960 < Date of Birth < 1976
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date £ iii Firm J(i,£)
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t)
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t)
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J(i,1)
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t)
— Worksin lie de France
2.465
-0.333
-0.344
-0.667
-1.120
-1.307
-1.373
0.074
2.89 1
-9.681
-0.557
-0.944
-1.610
-3.400
-0.410
0.134
0.131
0.112
0.12
0.105
0.102
0.100
0.123
0.364
0.126
0.14I
0.118
0,127
0.142
0.037
Intercept
1925 < Date of Birth < 1929
1930 < Date of Birth < 1934
1935 < Date of Birth < 1939
1940 < Date of Birth < 1944
1945 < Date of Birth < 1949
1950 < Date of Birth < 1954
1955 < Date of Birth < 1959
1960 < Date of Birth < 1976
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date £ in Firm J(i, t)
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,i)
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t)
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date £ in Firm J(i,t)
Manager at Date £ in Firm J(i, t)
Works in lIe de France
0.803 0.14
0.005 0.13j
-0.109 0.117
-0.325 0.13u
-0.381 0.106
-0.379 0.194
-0.069 0.101
0.830 0.127
2.855 0 369
-0 193 0.134
-0.294 0.15
-0.217 0.125
-0.377 0.132
-I.311 0. 130°°
44Degree
5
Variable Coefficient SW. Err.
Intercept
1925 .Dateof Birth ￿1929
1930 < Date of Birth < 1934
1935 < Date of Birth < 1939
1940 ￿Dateof Birth < 1944
1945 < Date of Birth < 1949
1950 <Date of Birth ￿1954
1955 < Date of Birth < 1959
1960 < Date of Birth < 1976
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t)
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J(i t)
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date i in Firm J(i, t)
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date i in Firm J(i, t)
Manager at Date i in Firm J(i, t)
Works in lIe de France
3.985
0.392
0.734
0.446
0.090
-0.336
0.700
0.230
3.319
-1.306
-0.340
-2.494
-3.011
-5.195
-0.766
6
0.125
0.113
0.096
0.105
0.089
0.089
0.090
0.116
0.362
0.116
0.131
0.110
0.117
0.131
O
(11.
Ui
0111
11.1 10
0.102
0.102
0.103
1) 1 30
0.129
0.142
0. 121
0. 12C
0.141
ouSt;
1.714
0.266
0.471
0.318
0.000
-0.2 16
-0.363
0.312
2.742
-0.849
-0.006
-1.100
-1.030
-3.036
-0.510
Intercept
1925 < Date of Birth < 1929
1930 < Date of Birth < 1934
1935 < Date of Birth < 1939
1940 < Date of Birth < 1944
1945 < Date of Birth < 1949
1950 < Date of Birth < 1954
1955 < 1)ate of Birth < 11959
1960 < Date of Birth < 1976
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t)
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, L)
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date L inFirmJ(z, t)
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm .J(i, )
Managerat Date L in Firm J(i, t)
Works in lie de France
45 -46
Coefficient begree Variable -—_______________-Std.Err.
Intercept -0.141 0.158
1925 < Date of Birth < 1920 0 102 0179
1930 < Date of Birth < 1931 0.407 1)115
1935 < Date of Birth < 1939 0.349 0 154
1940 < Date of Birth < 1944 0.5 19 0.120
1945 < Date of Birth < 1940 0.653 0.123
1950< Date of Birth < 1951 0.843 0.121
1)55 < Date of Birth < 1959 1.704 0 145
1960 < Date of Birth < 1976 3.339 0 379
UiikiIled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i, t) -0.155 0 130
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i, t) -0.055 0.157
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.137 0.129
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i, t) -0.100 0.134
Manager at Date in Firm J(z, 1) -1.648 0.148
Works in lIe de France -0 399 0.0627.148 0.206
-O224 0.257
—0(3 0.200
-1.073 0.207
-1.743 0.169
-2.429 0.161
-3.433 0.157
.3323 0.175
-0.673 0.381
-0.787 0.196
-0.977 0.296
-2.466 0146
-4.352 0.165
-6.431 0,216
-0.983 0.070
Table 5: Degree Category Model Coefficients-\Vornen ree Variable Coefficient
7.296
Std. Err.
0.205
1 Intercept
1925 < Date of Birth < 1929
1930 < Date of Birth < 1934
1935 < Date of Birth < 1939
1940 < Date of Birth < 1944
1945 < Date of Birth < 1949
1950 < Date of Birth < 1954
1955 < Date of Birth ￿ 1959
1960 < Date of Birth < 1976
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t)
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t)
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm Jii, t)
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t)
Manager at Date tin Firm i(i,t) — Worksin lie de France
-0.723
-0.999
-1.393
-2.328
-3.023
-3.791
-3.082
1.070
-0.205
-0.634
-2.250
-3.853
-5.449
-0.925
0.257
0.199
0.206
0.169
0.16 1
0.156
0.172
0.382
0.195
0.295
0.144
0.161
0.191
- 0.069
Intept
1925 < Date of Birth < 1929
1930 < Date of Birth < 1934
1935 < Date of Birth < 1939
1940 < Date of Birth < 1944
1945 < Date of Birth < 1949
1950 < Date of Birth < 1954
1955< Dateof Birth < 1959
1960 < Date of Birth < 1976
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i, 1)
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t)
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J(i, t)
Skilled White-Collar Worker at. Date tin Firm J(i, t)
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t)
Works in lie de France
47Degree— Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
3 Intercept 4.645 0.211
1925(Dateof Birth <1929 -0.307 0.265
1930 <Dateof Birth <1934 -0.742 0.207
1935 <Dateof Birth <1939 -1.021 0.217
1940 <Dateof Birth <1944 -1.550 0.177
1945 <Dateof Birth <1949 -2.011 0.167
1950 <Dateof Birth <1954 -2.537 0.162
1955 <Dateof Birth <1959 -1.409 (3.176
1960 <Dateof Birth <1976 1.506 0.385
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i, 1) -0.778 0.202
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J(i,t) -0.840 0.308
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J(i,t) -1.218 0.149
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(it) -2.379 0.166
Manager at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -3.977 0.209
_____ Worksin lie de France -0.738 0.074
4 Intercept 2.263 0.223
1925 <Dateof Birth <1929 0.023 0.285
1930 <Dateof Birth <1934 -0.314 0.225
1935 <Dateof Birth <1939 -0.383 0.233
1940 <Dateof Birth <1944 -0.542 0.189
1945 < Date of Birth < 1949 -0.894 0.180
1950 <Dateof Birth <1954. -0.694 0.172
1955 <Dateof Birth <1959 0.075 0.187
1960 <Dateof Birth <1976 2.448 0.390
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date LinFirm J(i, 1) -0.248 0.210
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tinFirm J(i, t) -0.167 0.320
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i,i) -0.502 0.154
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -0.880 0.169
Manager at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -1.725 0.193
Works in lIe de France -0.462 0.076
48Degree Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
5 Intercept 4.555 0.211
1925 < Date of Birth < 1929 0.391 0.267
1930< Date of Birth < 1934 0.441 0.208
1935 < Date of Birth < 1939 0.371 0.214
1940< Date of Birth <1944 -0.057 0.177
1945< Date of Birth < 1949 -0.529 0.168
1950 <Dateof Birth < 1954 -1.022 0.163
1955 <Dateof Birth < 1959 -0.342 0.178
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 2.753 0.385
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i, t) -0.898 0.196
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.645 0.297
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -1.593 0.144
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i, t) -3.272 0.162
Manager at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -5.147 0.218
Works in lie de France -0.967 0.070
6 Intercept 2.693 0.231
1925 <Dateof Birth < 1929 -0.148 0.309
1930 <Dateof Birth <1934 0.111 0.233
1935 < Date of Birth < 1939 0.054 0.241
1940 <Dateof Birth < 1944 -0.210 0.199
1945 <Dateof Birth < 1949 -0.461 0.189
1950 <Dateof Birth <1954 -0.927 0.184
1955 <Dateof Birth <1959 -0.264 0.199
1960 <Dateof Birth < 1976 2.531 0.396
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J(i,L) -IJ969 0.212
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date t in Firm J(i, t) -0.675 0.320
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -1.008 0.153
Skilled White-Collar Worker at. Date tin Firrti J(i,t) -2.062 0.171
Manager at Date tin Firrii J(i,t) 4.133 0.27k?
Works in 1k de France -0.541 0.07
49Dcgrct 1 Variable Coeflicieiit Std. Evr.
Intercept 2.278 0223
1925 <Dateof Birth <1929 -0.137 0.289
1930 <Dateof Birth <1934 -0.201 0.224
1935 <Dateof Birth <1939 -0.361 0.233
1940 <Dateof Birth <1944 -0.439 0.189
1945<Dateof Birth <1949 -0.552 0.178
1950 <Dateof Birth <1954 -0.601 0.173
1955 <Date of Birth <1959 0.153 0.187
1960 < Date of Birth <1976 1.638 Q.39F
Unskilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i, t) -0.511 0.213
Skilled Blue-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,L) 0.064 0.315
Unskilled White-Collar Worker at Date tin Firm J(i,t) -0.749 0.155
Skilled White-Collar Worker at Date in Firm J(i, t) -0 047 U 166
Manager at Date tin Firm J(i, 1) -2.052 0.201
Works in lie de France -0 738 0 077
50With these estimated coefficients, we were able to calculatethe probabil-
ity that a given individual would have a degreein a particular category. We
used the data corresponding to the earliest date that anindividual appeared
in our sample to calculate these probabilities. The probabilitythat a given
individual i has a degree in category n was calculated as follows.For au
ñ E {1,2,3,4,5,6,7}, let
PREr =exp(x),
whereX represents the vector of covariates for individual i and /EP corre-
sponds to the vector of coefficients for degrees of categoryñ. Let
PRE =PRE.
Now, if ii E {1,2,3,4,5,6,7},
PRE
P (degree categoryg ==
1+ PREI'
and if ;i =8,
P (degree category =8)=1— P(degree categoryg =
Weused this degree category (actual, where possible, otherwise ilfl1)Uted)fur
all observations on the individual.
To calculate school leaving age we used table 14 in CEREQ-DEP-IN SEE
(1990), which provides the average age of termination for each French diploma
separately for men and women in 1986. Using the probability ofeach de-
gree category and the average school-leaving agefor degrees in that category
(the ages were fairly homogeneous within categories), we calculated ex1)ected
school-leaving age.
A.2.4 Job Seniority, and Total Labor Market Experience
Individuals fell into two categories with respect to the calculation of job
seniority (employer-specific experience): those for whom the first yearof
observation was 1976 and those who first appeared after 1976. For those
51individuals whose first observation was in 1976, we estimated the expected
length of the in-progress employment spell by a regression analysis using a
supplementary survey, the 1978 Enquête sur la Structure des Salaires (ESS,
Salary Structure Survey). In this survey, respondent establishments provided
information on seniority (in 1978), occupation, date of birth, industry, and
work location for a scientific sample of their employees. Using the ESS in-
formation, we estimated separate regressions for men and women to predict
seniority in 1976. The coefficients from these regressions were used to calcu-
late expected job seniority in 1976 for DAS individuals whose first observa-
tion was in 1976. The dependent variable in the supplementary ESS regres-
sions was current seniority with the employer and the explanatory variables
were date of birth (DOB), occupation (CSP, 1-digit), region of employment
(metropolitan Paris), and industry (NAP 100, approximately 2-digit).16 Ta-
ble 6 provides sample statistics for the ESS data. Results of these regressions
'6The excluded categories were: 1960<DOB1, CSPG2 (1 if i is an Unskilled Blue-Collar
Worker at Date t in firm J(i i)), and N89 (1 if firm J(i, t) is in industry 89, Financial
Organizations). The coefficients on the industry indicators are not shown below.
527.910
(7.796)
0.095
(0.293)
0.087
(0.281)
0.097
(0.296)
0.088
(0.283)
0.087
(0.282)
0.145
(0.352)
0.188
(0.391)
0.174
(0.379)
0.233
(0.423)
0.026
(0.161)
0.072
(0.258)
0.492
(0.500)
0.064
(0.245)
0.346
(0.476)
Table 6: ESS Variables and Means (Std. Deviations in Parentheses)
Variable Mean-MenMean-Women
Seniori ty ,J(i ,t)
DOB1924
1925 DOB1 1929
1930 DOB 1934
1935 DOB1 < 1939
1940 DOB 1944
1945 < DOBI < 1949
1950 < DOB, 1954
1955 < DOB 1959
Worked in lie de Francej,J(,)
CSP3O,J(,)
CSP40,c,J(,t)
CSP5O,tJ(I,)
CSP6 1 ,t,J(it)
CSP62,J(,i)
10.244
(9.27 1)
0.113
(0.317)
0.112
(0.315)
0.124
(0.330)
0.115
(0.3 19)
0.111
(0.3 14)
0.153
(0.360)
0.154
(0.36 1)
0.094
(0.292)
0.191
(0.393)
0.106
(0.308)
0.175
(0.380)
0.180
(0.384)
0.283
(0.450)
0.256
(0.437)
53are shown in equations 33 for men and 34 for women.
seniority,,J(,) =2.513
(0.081)
+14.151 [DOB ￿1924] +12.820 [1925 DOB,1929]
(0.067) (0.067)
+10.299 [1930 ￿ DOBI 1934] +7.445 [1935<DOB1 < iy]
(0.066) (0.067)
+4.748 [1940 < DOB, < 1944]+2.569 [1945 DOB, < 194}
(0.067) (0.065)
+0.612 [1950 DOB, 19541—0.642 [1955 DOB, < 1959]
(0.065) (0.067)
+4.039 CSP30,J(1,) +4.939 CSP40,l,J(1,)
(0.038) (0.031)
+ 1.885 CSP5O,J(,) +2.898 CSPG Ii,t,Jt,t)
(0.037) (0.027)
—0.958 lie de FranceI,J(,)
(0.026)
IV =547,746
R2 =0.461
(33)
54seniorityl,tJ(1) =2.114
(0.084)
+12.669 [DUB1 ￿ 1924] +11.014 [1925 DUB,1929)
(0.074) (0.075)
+8.979 [1930 DOBI 1934] +7.278 [1935 DOB, 1939
(0.073) (0.074)
+5.989 [1940 DOB1 ￿ 1944] +4.604 [1945 DOB, <1949]
(0.075) (0.070)
+2.822 [1950 ￿ DOB, 1954] +0.641 [1955 <DUB1<1959]
(0.068) (0.068)
+5.116 CSP3OI,t,J(1,t) +5.789 CSP4O,,,J(lt)
(0.082) (0.057)
+ 1.442 CSP5O,t,J(I,t) +2.429 CSP611t,J(1,t)
(0.037) (0.054)
—0.988 lIe de France,,J(l,1)
(0.03 1)
N =260,580
R2 =0.373
(34)
where
DOB, =Dateof Birth of Individual i
CSP3Ol,,J(l,) = 1if i is a Engineer, Professional or Manager
CSP40,.t,J(I) = 1if i is Technician or Technical White-Collar
CSP5OI,,J(1,t) = 1if i is any other White-Collar
CSP611,,J(l,t) = 1if i is a Skilled Blue-Collar
CSP62l,J(l,t) = 1if i is an Unskilled Blue-Collar
lie de France,J(1,) = 1if the establishment is in Ile-de-France.
(35)
We used these results to impute levels of job seniority in 1976 for the
left-censored DAS individuals first observed in 1976. If the individual was
left-ensored and the imputed job seniority was negative, we set job seniority
prior to 1976 to zero. If the individual was first observed after 1976, we as-
sumed that job seniority prior to the date of the first DAS observation for the
individual was zero. If the age at the date of ally observation (1976 or oth-
erwise) was less than the expected school-leaving age, both total laborforce
experience and prior job seniority were set to zero. In all other c?tses(when
55the age was greater than the expected school-leaving age), we calculated to-
tal labor market experience and job seniority as follows. If the observation
was the earliest appearance of the individual in our data, we set job seniority
equal to job seniority up to the date of the first observation plus the number
of days worked for that enterprise in the year of the first observation, divided
by 360 and we set total labor market experience to the current age less the
school-leaving age. If the observation was not the first for the individual but
there was an observation in the previous year for the person17, we added
1 to total labor market experience. If the individual was employed for the
majority of the current year by the same enterprise that employed him or her
for the majority of the previous year, i.e. SIRENS =SIREN_1,we added
1 to the level of seniority at t —1.if SIRENS SIREN_1, we set seniority
equal to the number of days worked divided by 360.
If, on the other hand, there was no observation in the previous year, we
distinguished between t =1982or i =1984and other years. When t 1982 or
1984, total labor market experience was increased by 1 (reflecting experience
gained in the year of the observation). If the current SIREN and the most
recent previous SIREN were the same, we added the number of days worked
over 360 to the most previous level of seniority. This is similar to assuming
that the worker was temporarily laid off, but retained his or her seniority in
the firm when recalled. Otherwise, we set seniority to the number of days
worked over 360.
In the case where t =1982or t =1984, if the preceding observation was 2
years earlier (i.e. the missing data only occurred over a periodwhen no data
were available for any individual), we increased total labor market experience
by 2. If SIREN_2 =SIREN,senioritywas increased by 2. If SIREN_2
SIRENS, seniority was increased by 0.5 plus the number of days worked over
36018.
'7The structure of our database is such that this condition (observations for individual i
at both t and t —1)could only fail to be satisfied under 3 conditions. The first is that the
individual was employed in the civil service in the intervening years. The second is that
the individual was unemployed for an entire calendar year. The third is that i =1982 or
t =1984, since we were not given access to the data for these years. We largely discount
the first possibility, since full-time civil servants rarely move out of the civil service one
they have entered (Meron (1988)). The other two possibilities are treated explicitly.
'8We assumed that the probability the individual was reemployed in the missing year was
equal to the probability that the individual was rcemployed in the observation year. Thus
the expected increment to job seniority is the share of the year worked in the observation
56If the preceding observation was more than 2 years earlier, we increased
total labor market experience by 1.519. If the current SIREN and the most
recent previous SIREN were the same, we added the number of days worked
over 360 plus 0.5 to the most previous level of seniority.This is similar
to assuming that the worker was recalled from temporary layoff with equal
probability in the observation year and in the missing year. If the two SIRENs
were different, we set seniority to 0.5 plus the number of daysworked over
360.
A.2.5 Elimination of Outliers
After calculating all of the individual level variables, we eliminated obser-
vations for which the log of the real annualized total compensation cost
(LFRA1SRE) was more than five standard deviations away from its pre-
dicted value based on a linear regression model with dependent variable
LFRAISRE, shown in equation (36). This gives us the analysis sample
year plus (0)+ (. 1)=0.5.
'9We assumed that the probability the individual was reemployed in the missing year
was equal to the probability that the individuatwas reemployed in the observation year.
Thus the expected increment to total labor market experience is (. 1)+ (.2)=1.5
57of 5,305,108 observations.
LFRAISRE =—3.250
(0.005)
+0.210 Males +0.123 lie de Francet
(0.000) (0.000)
+0.082 Yeart +0.056 Degree Category 2,
(0.000) (0.002)
+0.415 Degree Category 3 +0.627 Degree Category 4,
(0.002) (0.003)
+0.266 Degree Category 5 +0.642 Degree Category 6,
(0.001) (0.003)
+0.648 Degree Category 7 +1.421 Degree Category 8
(0.002) (0.003)
+0.055 Experienceit —0.222 Experience
(0.000) (0.003)
+0.052 Experience —0.005 Experience
(0.001) (0.000)
N =5,325,352
R2 =0.437
a =0.477
(36)
A.3 Supplementary information on projection method
variables
The derivation of the individual and firm effects took place in three basic
steps: an estimation of the "first-step equation"derived as equation (9),
an extraction and decomposition of the individual effect (os)into observ-
able (u1i) and unobservable (ag) components, and a decomposition of the
correlated component into the enterprise-specific constant effect (j),
theenterprise-specific coefficient on seniority (yij)andthe cntcrprisc-specific
coefficient on the linear spline at seniority of 10 years (y23).
58A.3.1 The First-Step Regression
Equation (5) represents the projection of the firm-specific variables onto firm
and individual data. In order to estimate the first-step equation (9), we
require (in addition to the seniority variable derived in section A.2.4 above)
some firm specific variable (denoted fJ(,t)tinequation (5)) and a vector of
means of some individual specific variables (denotedin equation (5)). We
calculated firm employment directly from the firms represented in the DAS
data. The sampling scheme of the DAS ensures that we have asample
of the private French working population. Since we have 10 years worth of
data on the French economy, we calculated fJ(1,g)as:
(2.5 x Number of DAS Observations for Firm J(i, t))
fJ(i,t)=
1000
—8.3.
Although this measure does not vary over time for a particular firm, it does
vary over time for an individual who changes employers, which is the essence
of our identification of firm effects relative to individual effects. The vector x
in equation (5) includes time-varying individual-specific variables. The vector
in equation (5) contains the individual specific means of the two individual-
specific variables onto which the firm effect was projected: individual i's total
labor market experience and total labor market experience squared at date
t. These individual-specific means were used in the calculation of the matrix
z. Table 7 presents the variables appearing in the matrix Zt.
Thefirst step equation (9) requires that the variables all be restated in
terms of deviations from individual-specific means shown below for men with
59Table 7: zVariablesand Means (Std. Deviations iii Parentheses)
TVariable Name Mean
FirmEmployment*MeanExperience1 ZX 15.710
(746.422)
FirmEmployment*MeanExperience ZX28 4.032
(222.783)
FirmEmployment *MeanExperience1 *SenioritySX 726.375
(8,747.38)
FirmEmployment *MeanExperience *SenioritySX21 178.764
(2,752.69)
FirmEmployment *MeanExperience1 *Seniority?S2X1 7,766.07
(135,011.21)
FirmEmployment*MeanExperience*SenioritytS2X21 2,175.18
(43,035.26)
more than one observation (37)
LFRAISRE =0.073EXPER1
(0.000)
-0.009 EXPER
(0.000)
+0.169 AN781
(0.001)
+0.615 AN821
(0.00 1)
+0.880 AN861
(0.002)
—1.477e-6 ZX21
(1.002e-5)
+6.99e-7 S2X1
(2e-8)
-0.451 EXPER
(0.003)
+0.080 ILEDF1
(0.00 1)
+0.266 AN791
(0.001)
+0.803 AN841
(0.002)
+0.906 AN871
(0.002)
—8.00 le-6 SX1
(2 .8e- 7)
—1.883e-6 S2X21
(6e-8)
N =3,248,901
R2 =0.604
a =0.245
+0.107 EXPER
(0.001)
+0.084 AN771
(0.001)
+0.394 AN80L
(0.00 1)
+0.860 AN851
(0.002)
+5.237e-5 ZX
(2.96e-6)
+1.977e-5 SX21
(1 .OOe-6)
(37)
60and for women with more than one observation (38).
LFRAISRE= 0.033EXPER1
(0.000)
-0.003EXPER4
(0.000)
+0.180 AN78
(0.00 1)
+0.639 AN821
(0.002)
+0.893 AN861
(0.003)
—1.29e-4 ZX2Lt
(2.263e-5)
+6.46e-7 S2X,
(6e-8)
—0.180 EXPER21
(0.004)
+0.078 ILEDF1
(0.002)
+0.281 AN79
(0.001)
+0.827 AN84
(0.002)
+0.915 AN87
(0.003)
—1.198e-5 SX1
(6. Oe- 7)
—1.713e-6 S2X2
(1.9e-7)
+0.040 EXPER3
(0.001)
+0.086 AN771
(0.001)
+0.4 12 AA'80,
(0.001)
+0.877 AN85L
(0.002)
+5.573e-5 ZX
(6.67e-6)
+2.847c-5 SX2
(1.94e-6i
A.3.2 Imputed firm effects
N =1,739,996
R2 =0.564
=0.256
(38)
For individual in firms with insufficient data to calculate a firm effect (less
than 10 observations in the firm), we ran a single regression of equation (17),
pooling all of the data and assigning the estimated coefficients to all firms
in the group. This group included 1,353,794 observatons (26% of the total),
although it represented 86% of the firms. The results of the regression on
this g:oup are presented in equation (39).
DLFRAJSRIL =—0.028+0.003 s—0.005s
(3.375e-4)(8.476e-5) (1.772e-4)
N =1,353,794
R2 =0.0013
61
(39)A.4 Construction of the Firm-Level Data
A.4.1 Calculation of the Firm-Level Averages
We need to calculate os,, uT/ and their respective variances based on the
c1and u,i estimated according to the procedure laid out in section?? above. ,uir,iare simply the means of aand url, weighted by individual-years. In
other words,
>[oT,j >[(u1rj)T1]
cx = , UT/=
$
whereT1 represents the number of observation for individual i for which he
or she is employed in firm j.Thevariances of c, uii are calculated as
>2 [Var(o) T1} >2 [Var(u) T13]
Var(a3) =
*
2 Var(ujii) 2
(T) (T)
since each cand Ujlj is a random variable with known variance. The variables
c5.,, ii3andY2jalreadyhave unique values for a given SIREN (enterprise).
Unfortunately, even having restricted estimation of firm-specific ,,7i3 and
'12jtothose SIRENs for which we had 10 or more observations, we still
ended up with some outliers. Thus, in cases where either —3 3 or
—2 2 or —2 Yi.+72j2, we set ,y',and 'Y2j equal to the
values estimated in the pooled regression. Weighting by individual-years,
this affected only 0.15 percent of the observations in our sample.
A.4.2 Firm-level Employment and Capital Stock
The variable EFFEC (effectif, in thousands of workers) measures the total
full-time employment in an enterprise as of December 31 (prior to 1984)
and the annual average full-time employment (1984 and later) as found in
the BIC. We then took its mean over all years that the firm appeared in
the sample to get MEFFEC, the mean number of employees. Total capital
in the enterprise is defined as the sum of Dettes (Debt) and Fonds propres
d'entreprise (Owners' Equity). Our capital measure is equal to Actif total
(Total assets) in French accounting systems. This information was taken
62directly from the BIC for every firm-year. We used a sector-by-sector, time
varying index of the cost of capital (KAPP, 1980=100), available from the
Banque de Donées Macroéconomiques (BDM). CAPITR is defined as total
capital divided by cost of capital (in millions of 1980 FF). MCAPITR is
the annual average of CAPITR over all available years for the firm. The
capital labor ratio is defined as CAPITR/EFFEC and its annual average is
MCAPITRF (thousands of 1980 FF)
A.4.3 Real Operating Income per Unit of Capital
We used the BIC to obtain the Excédent brut d'exploitation (Operating
Income), or EBE, for each firm in each year that it appeared in the firm
sample. The formula used to calculate the EBE is shown in equation 40.
EBE =ventesde marchandises (merchandise sold)
—achatde marchandises (merchandise purchased)
—variationde stock de marchandises
(variation in merchandise inventory)
+ ventes de biens (goods sold)
+ ventes de services (services sold)
+ production stockée (inventoried production)
+ production immobilisée (unfinished production)
—achatsde matièrespremières (primary materials purchased)
—variationde stocks sur matières premieres
(variation of primary materials inventories)
—autresachats et charges externes
(other purchases and outside charges)
+ subventions d'exploitation (incentives for production)
—impôts,taxes et versements assimilés
(value added tax and other accrued taxes on
or credits for production)
—salaireset traitements (salaries and benefits)
—chargessociales (payroll taxes)
(40)
The EBE was deflated by the prix de valeur ajoutée (value added price index),
also found in the BDM, to yield EBER (thousands of 1980 FF). EBER was
divided by CAPITR (times 1,000) to yield EBERC, real operating income
63per unit of capital (1980 FF). Lastly, we took the mean of EBERC over all
of the firm-years to get MEBERC, mean real operating income per unit of
capital (1980 FF).
A.4.4 Real Value Added Inclusive of Labor Costs
To calculate the valeur ajoutée réelle brute au coit des facteurs-(real value
added inclusive of labor costs), VABCFR, we divided the frais de personnel
(employer's compensation cost) from the BIC (thousands of FF) by the indice
des prix a la consornmation (consumer price index) from the BDM to yield
the employer's real compensation cost (thousands of 1980 FF). The results
was added to EBER, as defined above in section A.4.3, to yield the VABCFR,
real value added inclusive of labor costs (thousands of 1980 FF). VABCFR
was divided by EFFEC to yield VABCFRF, real value added inclusive of
factor costs per worker (1980 FF). We took the mean of VABCFRF over all
of the years that the firm appeared in the sample to get MVABCFRF, mean
real value added inclusive of labor costs per worker (1980 FF).
A.4.5 Employment structure
The variable MING, proportion of engineers, technicians and managers in
the work force (EFFEC), was calculated from the ESE using the PCS occu-
pation classification (35) for individuals in categories 30 and 40. MOQA, the
proportion of skilled workers in the work force, was calculated from the ESE
using the PCS occupation classification (35) for individuals in categories 50
and 61. Both variables were expressed as a ratio to EFFEC and averaged
over all the available firm-years.
B Model Appendix
Tables B1 to B3 show the first- and second-period wage equations for each
of the representative individuals as a function of the statistical parameters of
equation (1) and the parameters specified in each of the theoretical models
in section 3.1.
64Table Bi
Matching Model with Homogeneous Workers
IndividualWage Period 1 Wage Period 2
1 Yii=11+U1+ørnW Y12=+( +m+U1
2 Y21=P+a2+mW
3 J3j:JL+3+5m+)rn=W
Y42+a3+mW
5 ysi=i+
LL =w—
2 Y52=+5+n+'Yn =W +11
6 YIt+6+n+W+H
!
7 —12+C7+n 2 W— Y72+a7+m=W
I
8 Ys2+8+fl=W4
Y92+crg+cn=w-q-
Notes: Individual 1 enters type in firm in period 1; individual 2 entered type in
firm in period 0 (before period 1); individual 3 entered type n firm in period
0 (before period 1), had a negative matching outcome and left for a type in
firm; individual 4 enters type rn firm in period 2; individual 5 enters type
n firm in period 1, has a positive matching outcome; individual 6 entered
type n firm in period 0 (before period 1), had a positive matching outcome
and remained in type n firm for period 1; individual 7 enters type n firrn
has a negative matching outcome and leaves for a type in firm in period 2;
individuals 8 and 9 enter type n firm in period 2.
65Table B2
Rent-Splitting Model
1 y=/z+c1+=x1—smQY12/L+01+m+7,xj+s7Q
2 Y21 = / + 2 + m =— SmQY22 =/1 + 2 + n = 12 —sQ
3 Y3 = /L+ 03+= 13 + s,QY32 =+03++ = 13 —Q
4 y4l=p+o4+=x4+sQY42=+U4+mX2+3nQ
Notes: The quasi-rent is —Q in type m firm in period 1 and Q in period 2. 'l'he
quasi-rent is Q in type ri firm in period 1 and —Q in period 2. Individual 1
works in type rn firm in both periods. Individual 2 works in type in firm in
period 1 and in type n firm in period 2, Individual 3 works in type n firm in
both periods. Individual 4 works in type 11 firm in period 1 and in type in
firm in period 2.
Individual\Vagc Period I Wage Period 2
66Table B3
Incentive Model with Heterogeneous Workers
Yii = + a1 + m = W
= p + a2 + m =
Y31 = / + 3 + m = W
!/41 =/i+a4+c6n=y—6rq4
f5j
Y61 =+&6+n=y—Tq
Y71
Ysi
1/91
yi2=p+ai+m+ym W
Y22P+Q2+m+7m W
y32=p+a3+m+ym = W
6r 2 42/L+&4+n+7n=y+ --q+Orq4
8r 2 ys2=LL+as+n+7n=y+7q5+ôrq5
5r2
y72=p+a7+n+y =y+q+rq7
r 2 1/s2=+Q8++Yfl=y+ --q8
)r2 yg2=p+a9+n+7n=y+ 7q9
Notes: Individuals 1, 2, 3 belong to type in firm with qj, i = 1,2,3 hetweii (3 and
1/3, individuals 4 to 9 belong to type n firm with q1, i = 4 to 9 above 1/3,
Individuals 4, 5, 6, 7 pass the test, and receive the bonus; individuals S and
9 fail.
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